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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s June, 2002 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris2 follows
a pattern of cases that allow religion equal footing in the public sphere with secular
institutions and expression, so long as religion enters the arena as a result of a private
choice. This Article will refer to the principle found in these cases as the “private
choice doctrine.”3 As one commentator put it with regard to Zelman,
the Supreme Court played a calming role in the culture wars by declaring
that the era of strict separation between church and state is over. . . . The
Supreme Court’s vision of neutrality—which holds that a government
program enacted for a valid secular purpose is not unconstitutional if that
program incidentally benefits religious organizations—represents a
moderate and appealing vision for addressing church-state issues, one that
can accommodate the concerns of liberals and conservatives.4
1

This article began as a series of papers for Russell Hittinger’s class, Wall of Separation:
Church-State Doctrines, taught at the University of Tulsa in the Spring of 2002. I am deeply
indebted to Prof. Hittinger for the ideas presented in that course, and for his input into this
article. I also wish to extend my thanks, as always, to my husband, Paul Rahe.
2

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).

3

This term has also been used in Cynthia Bright, The Establishment Clause and School
Vouchers: Private Choice and Proposition 174, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 193, 217, 224 (1995).
4
Jeffrey Rosen, The Refining of Religious Neutrality, THE NEW YORK TIMES ON THE WEB
(June 28, 2002) at <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/28/opinion/28ROSE.html>.
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In Zelman, the Court examined the constitutionality of an Ohio pilot program that
took effect in the Cleveland City School District.5 One of the program’s provisions
permitted parents to use a tuition voucher for their children to attend public or
private schools, including religious schools.6 The statute authorizing the program
ensured that participating private schools remained affordable for the most
disadvantaged children,7 and required that the schools refrain from “advocat[ing] or
foster[ing] unlawful behavior or teach[ing] hatred of any person or group on the
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin or religion.”8
The Cleveland program exemplifies one attempt, informed by the reality of
religious pluralism, at a political solution to the perceived failure of the public school
system. The recent decision happily ends the divisive legacy of extreme separation,
and in this respect, promises to play “a calming role in the culture wars . . . .”9
Furthermore, the private choice doctrine affords much needed space for religious
speakers. The culture wars, however, will continue. Since the late 1940’s, the
Supreme Court has produced a cacophonous composition by its divergent
interpretations of the Establishment Clause. The disharmony besetting church-state
jurisprudence is the subject of this Article. It examines, in particular, the legal and
political theories that have tended to promote secular establishment in the United
States.
Part II discusses a series of precedents that support the private choice doctrine,
while Part III explores another influence in the doctrine’s development: the deep
lack of consensus among scholars and the judiciary with regard to certain aspects of
religion clause jurisprudence. Part IV attempts to situate the private choice doctrine
in its political context, which itself is in part the product of court decisions. Part V
addresses some risks associated with the private choice doctrine.
II. ZELMAN AND ITS HERITAGE
The crux of the majority opinion upholding the Cleveland program was the
element of parental choice. “Where tuition aid is spent[,]” the Chief Justice
observed, “depends solely upon where parents who receive tuition aid choose to
enroll their child.”10 The program satisfied the Establishment Clause at least in part
5

Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2462.

6

Id. at 2463.

7

Id. at 2464 (“Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need. Families
with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eligible to receive
90% of private school tuition up to $2,250. §§ 3313.978(A) and (C)(1). For these lowestincome families, participating private schools may not charge a parental co-payment greater
than $250. § 3313.976(A)(8). For all other families, the program pays 75% of tuition costs,
up to $1,875, with no co-payment cap. §§ 3313.976(A)(8), 3313.978(A). These families
receive tuition aid only if the number of available scholarships exceeds the number of lowincome children who choose to participate.” (footnote omitted)).
8
Id. at 2463 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A)(6) (Anderson 1999 and Supp.
2000)).
9

THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al.
eds., 17th ed. 2000).
10

Id. at 2464.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss2/5

2

2002-03] ZELMAN v. SIMMONS-HARRIS AND THE PRIVATE CHOICE

223

on account of its neutrality; as the Court explained, “any parent” could use the
vouchers, and “all schools within the district, religious or nonreligious” could accept
them.11 No “financial incentive” existed benefiting religious schools,12 and the Court
found, based on the record, no evidence that parents lacked the option of secular
schools.13 This last factor, according to the majority, ought not be interpreted
broadly: “The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not
turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private
schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at
a religious school.”14 In short, “neutral” programs like the one available to
Cleveland parents do not “carr[y] with [them] the imprimatur of government
endorsement.”15
Zelman is only the latest in a series of cases that forbid state disfavor of
religion.16 The private choice doctrine as articulated in these cases has provided a
11

Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2468 (emphasis in original).

12
Id. (quoting Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1986)).
13

Id. at 2469.

14

Id. at 2470. It is worth noting that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion places strong
emphasis on the issue of available secular choices. Id. at 2473-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Early in the opinion, she proposes to “elaborat[e] on the Court’s conclusion that this inquiry
should consider all reasonable educational alternatives to religious schools that are available to
parents.” Id. at 2473. In her analysis of the second prong of the Lemon test as applied to
“indirect aid cases[,]” she concludes, “[c]ourts are instructed to consider two factors: first,
whether the program administers aid in a neutral fashion . . . second, and more importantly,
whether beneficiaries of indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious
organizations when determining the organization to which they will direct that aid. If the
answer to either query is ‘no,’ the program should be struck down under the Establishment
Clause.” Id. at 2476 (emphasis added). The portion of the majority opinion she cites
addresses Justice Souter’s dissent. See id. at 2469-71. Earlier in the majority opinion,
however, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “where a government aid program is neutral with
respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn,
direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.” Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467. In contrast with the second prong of
Justice O’Connor’s test, see id., the Chief Justice in his concluding paragraph mentions the
ability of “individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular
and religious,” id. at 2473. One may conclude, then, that according to Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s understanding of what the Establishment Clause demands, there must be “genuine
choice[,]” but “most private schools” participating in a given voucher program need not be
secular. Id. at 2472. Although Justice O’Connor joined the majority, her concurring opinion
points in the direction of a more fact-specific inquiry, placing an emphasis on the availability
of secular alternatives in programs of private choice. Id. at 2473.
15

Id. at 2468 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

16
For discussions of the voucher issue, see Michael J. Frank, The Evolving Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence and School Vouchers, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 997 (2002); Steven K. Green,
The Legal Argument Against Private School Choice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 37 (1993); Laura S.
Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167 (2000); Michael A. Vaccari, Public Purpose and the
Public Funding of Sectarian Educational Institutions: A More Rational Approach after
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more or less consistent façade for religion clause jurisprudence. As discussed in Part
III, however, the legal theories underlying these decisions can fairly be described as
incoherent.
Widmar v. Vincent17 involved the University of Missouri at Kansas City’s
decision to deny a registered student organization access to its facilities for religious
meetings.18
The University had a policy of allowing recognized student
organizations to meet in its facilities.19 The Court determined that when the
University engaged in “discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the
religious content of a group’s intended speech,” it perpetrated a “content-based
exclusion[,]” and strict scrutiny applied.20 The Establishment Clause did not help the
University meet the requirements of strict scrutiny.21 Applying the test established in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,22 the Court found that allowing the group to meet on its
facilities easily passed the first and third prongs,23 and as to the second, provision of
a meeting place would result in only “incidental” benefits to religion, rather than
“primary advancement.”24 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on two
points: “First, an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur
of state approval on religious sects or practices. . . . Second, the forum is available to
a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers.”25
For the sake of clarity, it is worth exploring the Court’s understanding of public
fora. In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,26 the Court laid out
a classification scheme covering three types of public property, and discussed the
First Amendment rights of the public in each type.27 First, in “traditional public
forum . . . places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
Rosenberger and Agostini, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1998); Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Still Separate
and Still Unequal, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 685 (1995). On religion in the public arena more
generally, see Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatization of Religion, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 19 (1991).
17

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).

18

Id. at 265.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 269-70. The University “must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Id. at 270. For
another case involving religious speech on state property, see Lamb’s Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
21

See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-75.

22

403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test reads as follows: “First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.’” Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
23

See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72.

24

Id. at 273-74 (citations omitted).

25

Id. at 274.

26

Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).

27

Id.
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assembly and debate,” the state faces strict scrutiny in attempts to limit content-based
discrimination, but may enforce “regulations of the time, place, and manner of
expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.”28 Second, although the government need not maintain forever as a
public forum property it “has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity[,]”so long as that property does remain open, the same restrictions apply to
the government as in the first category.29 As a subset of the second type of forum,
the Court explained that the state might open property “for a limited purpose such as
use by certain groups”; the university facilities in Widmar fall into this category.30
Finally, in the case of “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication[,]” the state may enforce the restrictions applicable
to the first two types of forum, as well as additional limits on expression.31
In Board of Education v. Mergens,32 the Court applied the Equal Access Act33 to
a situation involving a high school student who sought official school recognition for
her Christian club.34 The Equal Access Act requires public high schools to refrain
from discrimination against student organizations “on the basis of the religious,
political, philosophical, or other content of the speech” at their meetings, if the
school offers a limited open forum.35 According to the Act, a “limited open forum”
occurs “whenever [a high] school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or
more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during
noninstructional time.”36 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court in two parts of her
opinion, determined that the school offered a “limited open forum[,]” and that it had
denied the student’s Christian club “equal access” as required by the Act.37
In concluding that this application of the Equal Access Act did not result in a
violation of the Establishment Clause,38 Justice O’Connor, joined in this portion of
the opinion by three other justices, applied the Lemon test, and determined that the
Act satisfied the first prong, because “Congress’ avowed purpose—to prevent
discrimination against religious and other types of speech—is undeniably secular.”39
As for the second prong, the Act enabled only “private speech endorsing religion,”

28

Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted).

29

Id.

30

Id. at 45 n.7.

31

Id. at 46.

32

Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).

33

20 U.S.C. § 4071 et seq. (1994).

34

Mergens, 496 U.S. at 226.

35

§ 4071(a).

36

§ 4071(b).

37

Mergens, 496 U.S. at 246-47.

38

Id. at 247-53.

39

Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
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not speech by the government.40 Justice O’Connor found neither state endorsement
of religion nor excessive entanglement with it.41 Justice Kennedy, in whose opinion
Justice Scalia joined, also found that the Act did not violate the Establishment
Clause, but reached this conclusion without the help of the Lemon test.42
As they pertain to future equal access cases, two principles from Mergens are
particularly important. First, in the plurality portion of the opinion, Justice
O’Connor took a giant step away from the radical separation established by the
Warren Court: “[t]he proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to
censor is not complicated.”43 According to this reasoning, the state can no longer
necessarily justify invasive restrictions on private speech on the grounds that the
speech somehow invokes governmental authority and brings an established church in
through the back door. Second, the Court decided Mergens based upon the Equal
Access Act, and explicitly did not determine whether the First Amendment required
the Act’s protection against discrimination.44
The Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia45
directly addressed the question of what the First Amendment requires with regard to
religious speech in a limited public forum.46 The case involved a University of
Virginia policy under which the University paid printers for the costs of producing
student publications.47 A student paper, its publisher, and several of its staff
members sued when the University refused to pay their printing costs on account of
the paper’s religious perspective.48 The Court determined that the University’s
decision violated the students’ free speech rights49 and that the Establishment Clause
did not mandate this deprivation.50
The Student Activities Fund, through which the University paid the printing
costs, constituted a limited forum.51 In reaching its conclusion with regard to free
speech, the Court distinguished between “content discrimination, which may be
permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum,” and “viewpoint
discrimination,” 52 “an egregious form of content discrimination.”53 The government
40

Id. at 250 (emphasis in original).

41

Id. at 252-53.

42

Mergens, 496 U.S. at 260-62. Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion in which
Justice Brennan joined, id. at 262-270; and Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, id. at
270-91.
43

Id. at 250.

44

Id. at 247.

45

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).

46

Id.

47

Id. at 822, 844.

48

Id. at 825-27.

49

Id. at 837.

50

Id. at 845.

51

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30.

52

Id. at 830.
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engages in viewpoint discrimination when it censors speech on the basis of “the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.”54
“[V]iewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations[,]”55 is precisely what the
University of Virginia had done.56
The Rosenberger decision foreshadows Zelman on two points. First, Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, distinguished between a situation in which the
government is the speaker (“when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes”)57 and
private speech in a limited forum provided by the government.58 In the latter case,
such as “when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a
message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers[,]” the government may not engage in viewpoint discrimination. 59
Second, in her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor relied on three sets of
circumstances in reaching the conclusion that the University was not “endorsing the
magazine’s religious perspective.”60 One of these circumstances was the fact that the
University did not control the student publications.61 Although Justice Kennedy
discussed the distinction between government and private speech in the context of
the free speech issue,62 both his point and Justice O’Connor’s illustrate the
importance, for at least some members of the Court, of the fact that the case involved
a private entity making a choice. For Justice Kennedy, this circumstance meant that
the private speaker deserved free speech protection; Justice O’Connor determined
that government endorsement of religion had not occurred in part because of the
independence of the private publication. In Rosenberger, this distinction served to
protect a diversity of viewpoints among campus publications; if the Court were to
read the Establishment Clause in such a way as to limit free speech, Justice Kennedy
concluded, the ideas exchanged in the University’s forum “would be both incomplete
and chilled . . . .”63
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Zelman devoted significant space
to three cases that reflect the principles of Widmar, Rosenberger and Mergens, but
more closely resemble Zelman in their facts.64 In Mueller v. Allen,65 the Court
53

Id. at 829.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 830.

56

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832.

57

Id. at 833 (citation omitted).

58

See id. at 834.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 849.

61

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 849.

62

Id. at 833-35.

63

Id. at 844.

64

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2465-67 (2002).
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upheld a Minnesota law permitting tax deductions for certain educational expenses,
including tuition to religious schools, under the Establishment Clause.66 Witters v.
Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind67 determined that a state scholarship
award to a student attending a religious school in order to become a pastor passed
Establishment Clause muster.68 The Court ruled in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District69 that the Establishment Clause permitted deaf children to receive
help from federally funded sign-language interpreters while attending religious
schools.70 All three cases developed the private choice doctrine before Zelman; the
taxpayers in Mueller and the students in Witters and Zobrest all spent government
money, or money from which the government would receive a portion, by their own
choosing, without implicating the state in their decision.
“The incidental
advancement of a religious mission,” Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded from these
cases, “or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably
attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with
the disbursement of benefits.”71
The Zelman Court itself made explicit reference to the history of the private
choice doctrine. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “our decisions have drawn a
consistent distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to
religious schools, . . . and programs of true private choice, in which government aid
reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of
private individuals.”72 He cited Rosenberger as authority for the former category.73
The private choice doctrine, however, has a foundation broader than simply vouchers
or even schools. The principle appears analogously in cases pertaining to speech in
public fora. Widmar, Rosenberger, Mergens and related cases address the thorny
problem of how, or whether, to regulate private choices in a government controlled
setting.
These cases are readily distinguishable from several relatively recent decisions
striking down government policies on Establishment Clause grounds, where the
Court perceived the state actor as lending its authority to a religious speaker. Lee v.
Weisman,74 for example, involved a school district policy of allowing members of
the clergy to pray at graduations.75 The litigation that eventually reached the
Supreme Court began with a middle school graduation ceremony during which
students stood to say the pledge of allegiance and remained standing while a rabbi
65

Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).

66

Id.; see Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466.

67

Witters v. Washington Dep’t Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1996).

68

Id. See Zelman 122 S. Ct. at 2466-67.

69

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).

70

Id.; see Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467.

71

Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2467.

72

Id. at 2465 (citations omitted).

73

Id.

74

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581 (1992).

75

Id.
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said a prayer.76 Justice Kennedy began his analysis by explaining that among the
“dominant facts” that “mark and control the confines of [the Court’s] decision” was
the fact that “[s]tate officials direct the performance of a formal religious exercise at
promotional and graduation ceremonies for secondary schools.”77 Later he observed,
“[t]he degree of school involvement here made it clear that the graduation prayers
bore the imprint of the State.” 78 Running through the policy arguments concerning
divisiveness79 and the discomfort of students who did not wish to pray80 was the fact
that in some sense the state itself purveyed the religious message. Thus, nothing like
a private choice situation existed because the rabbi in effect prayed on behalf of the
school district, rather than on his own behest.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Doe.81 In this case, a school district permitted an elected student to deliver a “brief
invocation and/or message” before high school football games.82 Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, was “not persuaded that the pregame invocations should be
regarded as ‘private speech.’”83 Quoting Lee, the Santa Fe Court concluded that
given the “degree of school involvement[,]” the district’s policy bore “the imprint of
the State.”84 Central to this determination was the fact that rather than allowing any
student to deliver an address before football games, it permitted only one to do so for
the season.85 Hence, the choice was not private.
It is important to note that, controversial as the concept of religious schools
receiving public funds through vouchers may be, the private choice doctrine finds
latent support even within the radical separationist tradition that began in the 1940’s.
In Everson v. Board of Education,86 the case that announced “a wall between church
and state” which “must be kept high and impregnable[,]”87 the Court concluded that
the First Amendment “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to
favor them.”88 The second prong of the test established in Lemon requires that a
law’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits

76

Id. at 583.

77

Id. at 586.

78

Id. at 590.

79

See id. at 587-88.

80

Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93.

81

530 U.S. 290 (2000).

82

Id. at 294, 298.

83

Id. at 302.

84

Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)).

85

Id. at 303.

86

330 U.S. 1 (1947).

87

Id. at 18.

88

Id.
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religion.”89 The principle of private choice for religion, then, is nothing new. The
novelty of Zelman and several of its predecessors lies in the application of that
principle. One might argue, probably rightly, that Justices Black and Frankfurter,
and perhaps Justice Burger as well, would not have looked favorably upon vouchers
for religious schools; moreover, the earlier cases differ from Zelman in significant
ways, as discussed below. It is nevertheless difficult to believe, if a system made
available state money for children to attend any school, public or private in a city,
and then rigorously screened the recipient schools for any hint of religion in their
curricula, denying parents the voucher money to send their children to schools
testing positive, that such a system would not “handicap” or “inhibit” religion.
Consistent support for the private choice doctrine, from language in Everson to
the Zelman decision itself, and the doctrine’s common sense approach to the problem
of religion in the public forum, however, obscure profound disagreements among
legal scholars and members of the Court as to how to apply those provisions of the
Constitution that concern religion.
III. CONTEXT
The private choice doctrine has developed in a climate of intense controversy on
two subjects: the scope of the Establishment Clause and the meaning of religion.90
A. Establishment Clause Battles
To do justice to the debates concerning the Establishment Clause, pertaining to
both the Framers’ original intent and to the Clause’s incorporation, requires far more
space than one part of one article. The classification below is not an attempt to
evaluate the arguments on their merits, but rather to illustrate the broad range of
proposed interpretations of the Establishment Clause, and consequently, the deep
divisions among theorists with regard to these interpretations. These differences
persist despite the few consistencies that appear in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence since Everson.
1. The Radical Separationist Substantive Interpretation
The first theory is the radical separationist substantive interpretation. This
reading of the Establishment Clause began with Everson, and continues to appear91
despite decisions like Zelman that moderate it. Everson articulated a substantive
reading of the Establishment Clause by providing a laundry list of applications as
follows:

89

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (emphasis added).

90

For several scholarly views on religion and the Constitution, see GERARD V. BRADLEY,
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987); JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1995); PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995);
JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 314-16
(Regnery Gateway 1986) (1840); JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000).
91

See e.g. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa.92
The language of the concluding paragraph evidences the extreme separationist
character of the opinion: “The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach.”93 Although the Court noted that government need not play the role
of “adversary” towards religion,94 its clear preoccupation lay with the possibility that
the state would befriend the church. The Court found constitutional a program under
which a New Jersey board of education reimbursed parents for the public bus fares
spent in transporting their children to schools, including parochial schools,95 but it
did so in order that it might not “inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending
its general State law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious
belief.”96 The state spent money “as a part of a general program under which it
pa[id] the fares of pupils attending public and other schools.”97 The decision, thus,
articulated a doctrine of strict separation, justifying the inevitable entanglement of
government and religious institutions only in cases involving general public welfare
provisions such as sidewalks, crossing guards, fire protection and reimbursement of
bus fares.98
The Everson Court adopted as authority for its interpretation James Madison’s A
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, the Virginia Bill for
Religious Liberty, and its preamble written by Thomas Jefferson.99 The First
Amendment’s provisions, Justice Black wrote, “had the same objective and were
intended to provide the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious

92

Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16.

93

Id. at 18.

94

Id.

95

See id. at 3, 18.

96

Id. at 16.

97

Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.

98

Id. at 17-18.

99

Id. at 11-13.
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liberty as the Virginia statute.”100 Attached as an appendix to the Everson decision
was Memorial and Remonstrance.101
Although Memorial and Remonstrance contains ambiguities that lend themselves
to the separationist cause, it is by no means certain Madison intended by the
document to pioneer for Virginia the type of radical separation the Everson Court
introduced. Memorial and Remonstrance contains both principled arguments and
arguments of practical policy. In the passages based upon principle, Madison
maintains first, that there is a right to freedom of conscience in religious matters, for
“[t]he religion . . . of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man, and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This
right is in its nature an unalienable right.”102 Second, he adds that because man’s
first obligation is to God, civil and legislative authority cannot compel him with
regard to religion, religious duty being “precedent, both in order of time and degree
of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.”103 His third principled argument is that
all sects deserve equal religious freedom.104
On the second point, with regard to the primacy of man’s duty towards God, he
concludes, “that in matters of religion no man’s right is abridged by the institution of
Civil Society, and that religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”105 The
second clause requires interpretation. Three explanations are readily conceivable:
first, the State must not intervene in Church matters; second, the State may not look
to the Church in determining questions of law; or third, the State should base its law
upon a general theism, and not look to revealed religions in civil matters. The
problem with the third interpretation of “wholly exempt from its cognizance” is that
it contradicts other arguments made in Memorial and Remonstrance; for example,
further on Madison claims that a religious establishment “at once discourages those
who are strangers to the light of [revelation] from coming into the region of it.”106 In
this passage, he makes the case for a policy of religious freedom aimed at fostering a
presumably Trinitarian teaching. The purpose of effective proselytization is
inconsistent with a theistic government that takes no cognizance of religion. The
inconsistency, however, does not necessarily mean Madison does not adopt the
theistic position: desiring a government based upon theistic principles, from whose
cognizance revealed “Religion is wholly exempt[,]” he might nonetheless have made
practical arguments intended to appeal to those who confessed a Trinitarian or other
revealed religion. But if one assumes Madison meant what he said, the other two
interpretations are more plausible.
100

Id. at 13 (citations omitted).

101

See id. at 63-72.

102

1 CHARLES S. HYNEMAN &
THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805 632

DONALD S. LUTZ, AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
(Liberty Press 1983).

DURING

103

Id.

104

Id. at 633-34. As a consequence of their “natural rights[,]” men “are . . . to be
considered as retaining an ‘equal title to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates
of conscience.’” Id. at 633.
105

Id. at 632.

106

Id. at 636 (bracketed text in HYNEMAN & LUTZ).
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The second interpretation, that is, that Madison intended to say that civil society
must not consider religious teaching in determining questions of law, is problematic
as well. Society must define the terms used in its laws, and in many cases, terms are
difficult to define without reference to religion. A state’s family law may provide
that alimony awards favor the non-adulterous over the adulterous, not necessarily in
order to encourage human perfection, but because the legislature may believe that
encouraging marital fidelity will lead to a stable society, and thus promote
prosperity. But one man’s polygamous marriage and another man’s remarriage are a
third man’s adultery. In order to apply the law, therefore, the legislature must take
cognizance of religion, because many people believe that marriage falls at least in
part under the authority of the Church.
Despite the ambiguities in Memorial and Remonstrance, Everson and its progeny
have stretched the document’s legacy beyond its writer’s intent. McCollum v. Board
of Education107 ruled unconstitutional a program allowing religious teachers to
provide instruction in public schools because of the use of “tax-supported public
school buildings” for “dissemination of religious doctrines[,]” and because the
program “affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils
for their religious classes through use of the state’s compulsory public school
machinery.”108 Following Everson, the Court required “a wall of separation between
Church and State.”109
The “wall” erected by McCollum distances civil society from religion far more
radically than do the principles articulated in Memorial and Remonstrance. Madison
wrote his document in opposition to a proposal to use tax money in support of the
Episcopal Church.110 The program at issue in McCollum differed from the Virginia
bill in three ways. First, the Virginia plan involved a tax in direct support of
religious education.111 Although Justice Black threw out the program in Champaign,
Illinois, in part, because the religious instruction took place in “tax-supported public
school buildings[,]”112 this portion of his argument has the least credibility of any in
the opinion. As Justice Black acknowledged in Everson, tax money already allowed
parochial schools “ordinary police and fire protection, connections for sewage
disposal, public highways and sidewalks.”113 Furthermore, the presence of religious
teachers did not cost Champaign taxpayers more money than they would otherwise
have spent to provide the school with heat and electricity during school hours.
Second, the Virginia plan provided state funding for a particular sect.114 In
Champaign, on the other hand, teachers offered instruction in the Protestant, Catholic

107

McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).

108

Id.

109

Id. at 211 (citation omitted).

110

HYNEMAN & LUTZ, supra note 102, at 631.

111

Id.

112

McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.

113

Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).

114

HYNEMAN & LUTZ, supra note 102, at 631.
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and Jewish religions,115 and the opinion gave no indication that practitioners of other
faiths would be excluded should they choose to participate. Finally, the Virginia bill
allowed only Quakers and Mennonites an exemption from the tax.116 Under the
Illinois program, parents signed cards requesting that their children receive religious
education, and those children whose parents did not sign a card pursued “secular
studies” elsewhere in the building.117
“We are all agreed[,]” Justice Frankfurter wrote in his concurring opinion, “that
the First and the Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating
in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an ‘established church.”118
Many a legal scholar, however, has disagreed. Memorial and Remonstrance, relied
upon by the Everson Court to welcome in this radical interpretation, advocates
nothing more than that Virginia refrain from promoting religious orthodoxy.
More fundamentally, what makes the attempt to root an interpretation of the
Establishment Clause in Memorial and Remonstrance unjustifiable lies in the fact
that Madison’s document pertained to a question of policy in Virginia, while the
First Amendment addressed the power of Congress. Furthermore, Madison’s
proposed version of an amendment concerning religious freedom,119 which could
have restrained state legislatures as well as Congress, was rejected.120 Even had
Congress enthusiastically adopted Madison’s language, the Virginia document would
still fail to serve as a model for extreme separationism; references to “the duty which
we owe to our Creator”121 and “the light of Christianity”122 belie neutrality between
“religious believers and non-believers.”123 Memorial and Remonstrance provided
the Everson Court with no foundation for its extreme separationist interpretation of
the Establishment Clause.124
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McCollum, 333 U.S. at 208-09.

116

HYNEMAN & LUTZ, supra note 102, at 633-34.

117

McCollum, 333 U.S. at 208-09.

118

Id. at 213.

119

“The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or any pretext infringed.” HAMBURGER, supra note 82, at 105.
120

See PAUL A. RAHE, REPUBLICS ANCIENT AND MODERN: CLASSICAL
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 750 (1992).

REPUBLICANISM AND
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HYNEMAN & LUTZ, supra note 102, at 632.
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Id. at 636. George Washington’s farewell address is further evidence of support for
religion among the founders. According to Washington, “‘religion and morality are
indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should
labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness—these firmest props of the duties of
men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and
cherish them.’” RAHE, supra note 113, at 755.
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Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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On incorporation of the First Amendment, see SMITH, supra note 94, at 49-54.
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2. The Moderate Substantive Interpretation
The moderate substantive interpretation holds that the Establishment Clause has
substantive meaning, which may apply to the states through incorporation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but it does not advocate enforcement of the strict level of
separation envisaged by those who adopt the extreme separationist substantive
interpretation.
Justice Reed’s dissenting opinion in McCollum adopts the moderate substantive
approach. “The history of American education is against” the proposition, he wrote,
“that religious instruction of public school children during school hours is
prohibited.”125 His substantive understanding of the Establishment Clause was that it
“may have been intended by Congress to be aimed only at a state church.”126 He
concurred with his more separation-minded colleagues that the government should
not “aid all or any religions or prefer one ‘over another[,]’” but he did not conclude
from these premises that the Champaign, Illinois program was unconstitutional.127
Perhaps the most clearly articulated expression of the moderate substantive
interpretation is Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree.128 Here, the
dissenting Justice distinguished his interpretation of the Establishment Clause from
the extreme separationist substantive interpretation.
Like the proponents of the more rigid theory, Justice Rehnquist considered the
Establishment Clause to have substantive meaning, although he disagreed with them
as to its content:
The Framers intended the Establishment Clause to prohibit the
designation of any church as a “national” one. The Clause was also
designed to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference for
one religious denomination or sect over others. Given the “incorporation”
of the Establishment Clause as against the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment in Everson, States are prohibited as well from establishing a
religion or discriminating between sects. As its history abundantly shows,
however, nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the government to
be strictly neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause
prohibit Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends
through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.129
Justice Rehnquist also took exception to the authority Justice Black relied upon
in shaping his interpretation of the Establishment Clause in Everson. In the 1947
decision, the Court concluded that “Madison and Jefferson” had “played such
leading roles” in the First Amendment’s “drafting and adoption.”130 As Justice
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McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 241 (1948).
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Id. at 244.
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Id. at 248.
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472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 113.
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Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947). The Court quoted Jefferson’s “wall of
separation” language from Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), see Everson, 330
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Rehnquist observed, however, “Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time
the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress
and ratified by the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short
note of courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by
Congress.”131 The dissenting Justice in Wallace also appeared to disagree with the
use of Memorial and Remonstrance and the Virginia statute as indicators of the
Framers’ intent with regard to the Establishment Clause.132
In his concurring opinion in Zelman,133 Justice Thomas offered an interpretation
of the Establishment Clause that also falls into the moderate substantive category:
[I]n the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state
action should be evaluated on different terms than similar action by the
Federal Government. “States, while bound to observe strict neutrality,
should be freer to experiment with involvment [in religion]—on a neutral
basis—than the Federal Government.” . . . Thus, while the Federal
Government may “make no law respecting an establishment of religion,”
the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so long
as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual
religious liberty interest. By considering the particular religious liberty
right alleged to be invaded by a State, federal courts can strike a proper
balance between the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment on the one
hand and the federalism prerogatives of the States on the other.134
Although Justice Thomas’ position has much in common with the jurisdictional
interpretation discussed below, he gave substantive effect to the Establishment
Clause by eliciting a “strict neutrality” requirement against the states, as well as the
condition that no state law may impinge upon what he interprets to be Free Exercise
principles. The thrust of his interpretation, however, clearly lay in an attempt to limit
the effect of incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Thomas articulated a consequence of his interpretation in his concurring
opinion in Rosenberger.135 There he pointed out a lack of “evidence that the Framers
intended to disable religious entities from participating on neutral terms in

U.S. at 16, which in turn quoted a letter from Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association,
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92.
131

Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92.

132

See id. at 98-99. In Schempp, he wrote, “the Court made the truly remarkable statement
that ‘the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came to be
incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our States’
(footnote omitted). On the basis of what evidence we have, this statement is demonstrably
incorrect as a matter of history.” Id. at 99.
133
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2480-84 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
134

Id. at 2481 (citation and footnote omitted).

135

See Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852-63 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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evenhanded government programs. The evidence that does exist points in the
opposite direction and provides ample support for today’s decision.”136
What the moderate substantive approaches have in common is that they do not
embrace the requirement adopted by the extreme separationists in Everson that
government “be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers.”137 They tend instead to discern the meaning of the Establishment Clause
as forbidding discrimination “between sects.”138 It is worth noting that a proponent
of a moderate substantive interpretation authored the Zelman decision.
3. The Jurisdictional Interpretation
Steven D. Smith raises this alternative in his book, Foreordained Failure: The
Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom. This interpretation is
clearly distinguishable from the substantive interpretations because Smith argues that
according to their “original meaning[,] . . . the religion clauses . . . did not adopt any
substantive right or principle of religious freedom.”139 He reads both religion clauses
as preventing the imposition by Congress against the states of federal laws
concerning religion.140
Accordingly, incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment resulted in a nullity; because not even the states could address the
substantive question of how government ought to treat religion, the Supreme Court
took up the job, and Everson and its progeny resulted.141 Smith bases his
interpretation on the diversity of opinion at the founding as to the proper relationship
between government and religion,142 and the relative lack of controversy surrounding
the ratification of the clauses.143 As to Congress’ regulation of religion in the
territories, Smith argues that this fact only underscores the clauses’ jurisdictional
nature in limiting federal power over the states.144
B. “Religion” Defined
The history of Supreme Court jurisprudence on “religion” has yielded no
consensus as to the term’s meaning. In Reynolds v. United States, a case that upheld
the constitutionality of a law forbidding polygamy,145 the Court observed that “[t]he
word ‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution[,]” and proposed “to go elsewhere .
. . to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately . . . than to the history of
the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted.”146 In reaching its
136

Id. at 863.
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Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985).
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SMITH, supra note 82, at 17.
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Id. 21.
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Id. at 49.
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Id. at 19-22, 26.
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Id. at 26-27.
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SMITH, supra note 82, at 27-30.
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conclusion that by the Free Exercise Clause, the framers took from congress “all
legislative power over mere opinion,” but left it “free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order[,]”147 the Court touched on the
definition of “religion” appearing in Memorial and Remonstrance; i.e., “‘the duty we
owe the Creator . . . .’”148
If one were to place the Reynolds definition on the narrow end of a spectrum
reflecting what religion has been taken to mean, Justice Kennedy’s explication in Lee
would occupy that spectrum’s opposite end. He wrote there that “we acknowledge
the profound belief of adherents to many faiths that there must be a place in the
student’s life for precepts of a morality higher even than the law we today
enforce.”149 The complication of this latter definition is that it includes within the
ambit of religion sets of opinions not generally considered religious, such as
Aristotelian natural right theory and Kantian moral philosophy.
Two draft cases also evince disparate attempts to settle upon a meaning of
religion. Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting in United States v. Macintosh,150 described
“[t]he essence of religion” as “belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation.”151 A later case reached a more expansive
definition. In construing an Act of Congress that described who might be classified
as a conscientious objector, the Court in United States v. Seeger152 construed
“religious training and belief” in the statute to include “all sincere religious beliefs
which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is
subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent. The test might be stated
in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for
the exemption comes within the statutory definition.”153
The trajectory of definitions over time might suggest that the Court has
developed a broader reading of the term “religion” in more recent decades;
Wisconsin v. Yoder,154 however, belies this notion. Yoder overturned on Free
Exercise grounds the conviction of three families for failing to send their children to
school.155 The families, two Old Order Amish and one Conservative Amish
Mennonite, chose not to comply with Wisconsin’s compulsory education law
because it violated their religious beliefs to send their children to high school.156
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, reasoned that “if the Amish asserted
their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary
147

Id. at 164.

148

Id. at 163.
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Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (emphasis added).
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secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values
of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a
religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than
religious.”157
When the Court moves away from defining religion as man’s duties towards
God, the concept of religious freedom becomes very extensive. In West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,158 Justice Jackson, writing for the Court,
enjoined the enforcement of a State policy of requiring the pledge of allegiance in
public schools.159 The parties requesting injunctive relief against the policy did so on
the grounds that the flag salute violated their religious beliefs.160 “If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation,” the Court stated, “it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now
occur to us.”161 This sweeping language prefigures that found in Griswold v.
Connecticut162 (“specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance”)163 and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey164 (“[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life”).165
The expansive understanding of religious freedom that results when religion is
broadly defined, however, presents a problem for advocates of the extreme
separationist interpretation: if the Court enforces strict separation between church
and state, and just about anything qualifies as a church, then the teaching power of
the state is severely restricted. Public schools would have to set aside much of their
curriculum if presenting “precepts of a morality higher even than the law”166
constitutes teaching religion.
One resolution to the quandry of how to define religion is to emphasize free
speech rather than religious freedom, as the Court did in Widmar and Rosenberger.
Protecting religious speech, however, will often require the private choice doctrine.
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163

Id. at 484.

164

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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IV. THE PRUDENCE OF THE PRIVATE CHOICE DOCTRINE
As discussed above, substantial theoretical differences on several grounds
surround the development of the private choice doctrine applied in Zelman. In his
dissent in Board of Education v. Mergens,167 Justice Stevens criticized the
doctrine.168 He concluded that the Court’s decision applying a federal statute that
limited discrimination against student-run religious organizations with regard to use
of public high school property,
leads to a sweeping intrusion by the Federal Government into the
operation of our public schools, and does so despite the absence of any
indication that Congress intended to divest local school districts of their
power to shape the educational environment.
If a high school
administration continues to believe that it is sound policy to exclude
controversial groups, such as political clubs, the Ku Klux Klan, and
perhaps gay rights advocacy groups, from its facilities, it now must also
close its doors to traditional extracurricular activities that are
noncontroversial but not directly related to any course being offered at the
school.169
Although Justice Stevens addressed the application of an Act of Congress, his
reasoning easily applies to the private choice doctrine as a whole. The Court’s
application of the Establishment Clause to the facts of Zelman, by analogy, could be
construed, given another set of facts,170 as a broad grant of federal authority to
monitor discrimination against religious schools, and a denial of local autonomy.
The irony of Justice Stevens’ Mergens dissent is that it is precisely the “sweeping
intrusion” of the Supreme Court in cases like McCollum that “divest[s] local school
districts of their power to shape the educational environment.” In McCollum, the
Court invalidated on Establishment Clause grounds a voluntary, nondiscriminatory
program under which students received religious education on public school property
during school hours.171 A cynic might argue that the local autonomy principle serves
no other purpose than to attack positions that the person raising it does not like.
Justice Stevens himself wrote a dissenting opinion in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU172 arguing that the Court should divest a city-county of its power to display a
Christmas tree and Chanukah menorah in front of a public building173 because “[t]he
overall display thus manifests governmental approval of the Jewish and Christian
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Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
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Id. at 270-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 290.
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religions.”174 More significantly, he wrote the Court’s opinion in Santa Fe, which
concluded, against the interests of local autonomy, that a school policy of allowing
an elected student officer to deliver an invocation before football games violated the
Establishment Clause.175 Justice Stevens’ view appears to be that the Court ought to
defend local autonomy when officials want to exclude religion from the public
forum, and abrogate it when they attempt to give religion space. The Justice would
probably reply that “a strong presumption against the public use of religious symbols
. . . will prohibit a display only when its message, evaluated in the context in which it
is presented, is nonsecular”;176 and that the nature of the Establishment Clause at
times requires the extreme separation he has advocated. Other interpreters of the
Establishment Clause, however, have not arrived at the conclusion that the Framers
intended to discourage religion in this way. The question remains, whether a
position adopting either the moderate substantive or jurisdictional interpretation of
the Establishment Clause, while at the same time offering affirmative protection to
speech, including religious speech, in the public fora, falls prey to the same
inconsistency.
Some discussion of the environment in which these court decisions have taken
place may be of help in exploring the issue of affirmative protection for religious
speech. Compulsory schooling means that the state is a very substantial influence in
the American household through its role in the upbringing of young people. It is
worthwhile examining how religion came to figure in relation to this influence. As
the Establishment Clause jurisprudence following Everson demonstrates, that
influence proved to be anything but neutral towards religion. No decision better
illustrates this fact than McCollum.
In his most radical argument in McCollum, Justice Black opposed the provision
of “an invaluable aid” to religious education,177 and it is on this reasoning that Justice
Frankfurter elaborated in his concurring opinion. “The Champaign arrangement[,]”
the latter argued, “presents powerful elements of inherent pressure by the school
system in the interest of religious sects.”178 Justice Frankfurter, thus, characterized
public policy favoring religion over non-religion as a threat. Here, McCollum differs
even from Memorial and Remonstrance, which refers to religion as “the duty which
we owe to our Creator.”179 Although Justice Frankfurter cited the “preservation . . .
of religion from censorship and coercion however subtly exercised”180 as a good
derivative from the strict separation he promoted, much of his opinion focused upon
what he perceived as the dangers of sectarianism.
Justice Frankfurter argued that religious education in public schools has the
potential to undercut what he describes as the purpose of the public school system.
“Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion
174
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among a heterogeneous democratic people,” the public school system, he reasoned,
“must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects.”181 Religious
education, accordingly, must take place “in the individual’s church and home.”182 He
handed the ambitious project of serving on the front lines of the effort to assimilate
diverse groups into American culture to public schools, which had developed
relatively recently in the United States.183 He also discussed the challenges parents
faced in providing their children with religious instruction,184 but after the Everson
and McCollum decisions, he could not reasonably have expected this task to become
easier. While insisting that religious education remain out of the picture, Justice
Frankfurter’s opinion welcomed the expansion of a state influence, the public school,
which had a purpose broader than academic instruction. He claimed that “[t]he
secular public school did not imply indifference to the basic role of religion in the
life of the people,”185 but the manner in which the Warren Court applied the
Establishment Clause to public schools has since helped to crowd religion out of
public discourse.
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in McCollum in effect advocated
banishing religion from American public life. “Separation[,]” he explained, “is a
requirement to abstain from fusing functions of Government and of religious sects,
not merely to treat them all equally.”186 He decried the “obvious pressure upon
children to attend”187 the religious instruction offered by the Champaign program,
although the Supreme Court has not in other contexts seen fit to address peer
pressure among children. Justice Frankfurter sought to enlist the Court in preventing
the possibility that “feeling[s] of separatism”188 will arise in the context of religious
differences among students. He argued that “[t]he claims of religion were not
minimized by refusing to make the public schools agencies for their assertion[,]”189
but he did not examine the teaching power of such a radical separation between
church and state, and its potential to exert a secularizing influence on American
society.
One of two assumptions must underlie the position Justice Frankfurter took: that
the teaching power of the law through public education is ineffective, or that it is
effective. If the former is the case, it is futile to hope that public schools will “serve
as perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous
democratic people.”190 On the other hand, if one assumes the latter, the policy of
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relegating religious education to “the individual’s church and home”191 at best
teaches that religion is of little importance, and at worst promotes the establishment
of irreligion. By confining religion to the private sphere, and thus, attempting to
render it a mere “personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like
pornography, in the privacy of one’s room[,]”192 the Court places religion and
pornography on a par by implying that the decency of the public square depends
upon the exclusion of both. The Congress that framed the First Amendment
eschewed this conclusion when it established chaplaincies and proclaimed a day of
Thanksgiving.193
It is worth noting that Justice Frankfurter’s plans for the public school sprang
from intense personal conviction. “As one who has no ties with any formal
religion,” he once explained,
perhaps the feelings that underlie religious forms for me run into
intensification of my feelings about American citizenship. . . . American
citizenship implies entering upon a fellowship which binds people
together by devotion to certain feelings and ideas and ideals summarized
as a requirement that they be attached to the principles of the
Constitution.194
Justice Frankfurter was not alone in his apparent desire to establish irreligion. John
Dewey’s influence on American public schools also suggests such an establishment.
In his book, A Common Faith, Dewey openly attacks revealed religion.
He begins by implying that all such religions are false. He starts with a
discussion of the variety of deities, devotions and moral teachings existing
throughout the world.195 Many religious beliefs and practices, he adds, are
harmful;196 “historic religions have been relative to the conditions of social culture in
which peoples lived.”197 He also contends that reason and choice are incompatible
with accepting revelation. “[W]hen we begin to select, to choose, and say that some
present ways of thinking about the unseen powers are better than others[,]” he
claims, “ . . . we have entered upon a road that has not yet come to an end.”198
In another closely related argument, Dewey maintains that acceptance of
religious authority is intellectually dishonest. “What we ardently desire to have thus
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and so, we tend to believe is already so.”199 Moreover, he ascribes religious
experience to an imaginative process involving “a thoroughgoing and deep-seated
harmonizing of the self with the Universe.”200 What the faithful imagine or idealize
they convert into an invisible reality, and they seek to conform their conduct to the
dictates of their belief.201
Dewey treats the decision to adhere to the teachings of a revealed religion rather
than to pursue inventive progress as a kind of moral weakness. “Belief in the
supernatural as a necessary power for apprehension of the ideal and for practical
attachment to it has for its counterpart a pessimistic belief in the corruption and
impotency of natural means.”202 Faith in divine intervention is not only ineffectual, it
“is too easy a way out of difficulties.”203
If we leave aside for the moment Dewey’s almost unmitigated optimism
concerning the adequacy of human reason unguided by authority or tradition,204 his
depiction of revealed religion as false and of its adherents as intellectually dishonest
and morally weak provides some grounding for his conclusion that “[i]nterest in the
supernatural therefore reinforces other vested interests to prolong the social reign of
accident.”205 Although Dewey does not propose it, a political project to destroy
religion logically follows. Should the truth of revelation remain a possibility, he
might present his progressivism as one among many theories for philosophers to
explore, and it would lose its urgency as a political project. The efficacy of Dewey’s
teaching thus depends upon a thoroughgoing rejection of revealed religion, and even
upon a public policy aimed at its destruction.
It is worth noting that Smith argues in Foreordained Failure against the
possibility of government neutrality towards religion. He maintains that “any
account of religious freedom will necessarily depend on—and hence will stand or
fall along with—more basic background beliefs concerning matters of religion and
theology, the proper role of government, and ‘human nature.’”206 What is more, “[i]n
adopting a theory of religious freedom that is consistent with some background
beliefs but not with others, therefore, government (or the judge or the legal scholar)
must adopt, or privilege, one of the competing secular or religious positions[,]” a
result that “is precisely what modern theories of religious freedom seek to avoid.”207
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The supposition, for example, that the government can remain neutral by adopting a
secular position falls prey to this problem because it involves an imposition of
secularism over various religious traditions.208 Adopting secularism as an attempt at
finding common ground among conflicting traditions similarly fails because from the
perspective of many religious believers, secularism does not provide common
ground.209
The issue of “divisiveness” in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
a persuasive argument for Smith’s theory regarding neutrality. In McCollum, Justice
Frankfurter bit his nails over religion’s potential to divide people. “Designed to
serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a
heterogeneous democratic people,” he wrote,
[T]he public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the
strife of sects. The preservation of the community from divisive conflicts,
of Government from irreconcilable pressures by religious groups, of
religion from censorship and coercion however subtly exercised, requires
strict confinement of the State to instruction other than religious, leaving
to the individual’s church and home, indoctrination in the faith of his
choice.210
Justice Kennedy sounded a calmer note in Lee, but worried nonetheless:
Divisiveness, of course, can attend any state decision respecting religions,
and neither its existence nor its potential necessarily invalidates the State’s
attempts to accommodate religion in all cases. The potential for
divisiveness is of particular relevance here though, because it centers
around an overt religious exercise in a secondary school environment
where subtle coercive pressures exist and where the student had no real
alternative which would have allowed her to avoid the fact or appearance
of participation.211
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Zelman, moreover, raised the perceived
“risk that publicly financed voucher programs pose in terms of religiously based
social conflict.”212 None of these discussions of divisiveness appear to contemplate
the divisive effect of extreme separation mandated by the judiciary. If anything, the
stream of Establishment Clause cases that has wound its way toward the Supreme
Court over the past nearly sixty years demonstrates that the attempt to erect a “high
and impregnable” “wall between church and state”213 has, if anything, exacerbated
conflict pertaining to religion in American public life. To use Smith’s paradigm, the
Court, in seeking to eliminate divisiveness, does so on the presumption that the
ordinary divisiveness that occurs between sects is intolerable, but not the
208
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divisiveness fostered by extreme separationist jurisprudence between members of the
various sects and those who propose to ban religion from the public square.
Expansive Court protection of free speech is not uncomplicated, even in public
fora. Government may have compelling reasons to limit speech, as Justice Stevens
wrote with regard to student organizations in public schools,214 and in the case of a
democracy, those reasons may be even more compelling, if not less problematic than
they are in other regimes. A thorough examination of this aspect of First
Amendment jurisprudence, however, requires placing it in the context of what the
public forum has come to mean, and the role it plays in the lives of Americans. Such
an examination may not justify the Court’s active defense of free speech against state
and local governments in the eyes of those who do not believe that the Court should
have incorporated the First Amendment in the first place; as Justice Souter put it in
his dissenting opinion in Zelman, “[c]onstitutional limitations are placed on
government to preserve constitutional values in hard cases.”215 Political libertarians
and many others, however, may well applaud the private choice doctrine as an
expansion of individual liberty at the expense of State monopoly; and when the
doctrine is applied against the federal government, even those opposed to
incorporation will be inclined to support it.
V. THE PROBLEMS OF CHURCH AND STATE
As mentioned above, the voucher money at issue in Zelman came with strings
attached. One string required that any participating school must not “discriminate on
the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background. . . .”216 Another proscribed the
promotion of “‘unlawful behavior’” or “‘hatred of any person or group on the basis
of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion.’”217 Schools were also required to
meet state academic standards.218
The requirements may seem innocuous enough, but Justice Souter saw them as
cause for concern. In his dissenting opinion, he reflected upon the threat posed by
programs like the one in Cleveland “to the primacy of the schools’ mission to
educate the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of their
faith.”219 The prohibition against discrimination on the basis of religion, he noted,
prevented religious schools from giving admission preferences to children in their
own congregation or parish.220 The provision concerning “‘hatred . . . ‘on the basis
of’ . . . ‘religion,’” he added, “could be understood (or subsequently broadened) to
prohibit” any teachings concerning “the error, sinfulness, or ignorance of others, if
they want government money for their schools.”221
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Justice Souter’s critique, when extended, applies even to state academic
standards. A fundamentalist Christian school, for example, might offer classes on
creation theory and abjure any reference to evolution. Should the state mandate
evolution as a portion of its biology standards, the school would fail to meet the
standards.
A case in point of a school changing its policies when the government withheld a
monetary incentive is Bob Jones University v. United States.222 In Bob Jones, the
Court upheld the revocation of the University’s tax-exempt status.223 The decision
does not present especially novel legal theory, except perhaps in its interpretation of
a portion of the Internal Revenue Code,224 but it is historical evidence of the power,
and perhaps the propensity, of government to induce dissenting institutions to
conform to majoritarian practices.
Although the racists of Bob Jones University deserve scant sympathy, their story
illustrates the manner in which hard cases make bad law. A state might enact a
statute prohibiting institutions that discriminate on the basis of sex from receiving
voucher money.225 Schools operated by Orthodox Jews or the Roman Catholic
Church would easily fall on the wrong side of this law because women cannot
become Orthodox rabbis or Catholic priests. Another law might withhold voucher
money from schools that practice discrimination based on sexual practices. The
myriad religious communities that condemn sodomy would then be forced to choose
between state money and applying the tenets of their faith to hiring decisions. One
might argue that no harm will be done, because most religious institutions will stick
to their guns and pass on the voucher money; nevertheless, there is something deeply
troubling about the state offering carrots to the church on the condition that it violate
its teachings.
Legislatures may or may not defend minority religious beliefs. Whether they do
so depends upon the time and place and political climate in which laws are made.
The Free Exercise Clause, moreover, will probably not provide a buffer against
legislatures. In Employment Division v. Smith,226 the Court determined that religious
beliefs do not provide an exemption “from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”227 Although the case involved
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a criminal prohibition (and a government denial of unemployment benefits as a
consequence of violating that prohibition),228 nothing in the opinion indicates that its
application will be limited to the criminal context.229 The Court acknowledged
precedents “bar[ring] application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action” on Free Exercise grounds, but explained that these cases also
involved “other constitutional protections” as well.230 It is not readily apparent how
a party seeking Free Exercise protection in a case involving a voucher program could
summon the help of any other constitutional provisions. Smith may seem unduly
severe towards unpopular religious practices, but a more active legal standard is not
without its difficulties.
Cases prior to Smith bear out the difficulty of court-imposed concepts of
neutrality with regard to religion. For example, in his dissent in Zorach v. Clauson,
Justice Black opined that
[u]nder our system of religious freedom, people have gone to their
religious sanctuaries not because they feared the law but because they
loved their God. The choice of all has been as free as the choice of those
who answered the call to worship moved only by the music of the old
Sunday morning church bells.231
In articulating a theory of “religious freedom,” he does so on the basis of a viewpoint
that acknowledges only those religious traditions under which adherents do not
worship “because they fear[] the law”; many Americans, however, believe and
practice precisely on account of their fear of God’s law.232
In Free Exercise Jurisprudence as well, the Court has weighed in heavily. Chief
Justice Burger in Yoder relied on his own finding that “the values and programs of
the modern secondary school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life
mandated by the Amish religion” in order to grant Amish parents a religious
exemption from a state mandatory attendance law.233 The Amish were fortunate in
that the Court found that they had been able “to function effectively in their day-today life under self-imposed limitations on relations with the world, and to survive
and prosper in contemporary society.”234
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In short, decisions like Zorach and Yoder place the Court in the position of
actively favoring certain religious beliefs and practices and discouraging others. The
judiciary therefore becomes the vehicle for preferring one tradition over another, and
in so doing creating what might be called an establishment. Although one may argue
the meaning of Madison’s statement in Memorial and Remonstrance, “religion is
wholly exempt from [Civil Society’s] cognizance[,]”235 the Court, beginning with
Everson and until Smith, clearly took scrutinizing cognizance of religious doctrine.
Justice Black’s reliance on religious politics in eighteenth century Virginia is thus
ironic as well as erroneous.236
The Court’s hands-off approach taken in Smith, on the other hand, may leave
minorities with little protection against the power of the state. Compelling children
to salute the flag237 and regulating the shape of families238 could conceivably fall
under the “unavoidable consequence of democratic government[,]”239 the tyranny of
the majority.
The difficulty is that courts are often jealous of their jurisdiction, and thus have
an interest in resolving questions of faith when these problems intersect with legal
and political issues. Needless to say, courts do not have the same stake in doctrinal
purity that religious practitioners have. When the court tries like Constantine to
arbitrate in religious matters, it is inevitable that an Establishment Clause problem
crops up. Ironically, once the state becomes involved in enforcing this type of court
decision, a Free Exercise Clause problem enters the picture as well. Harsh as Smith
may seem, it leaves the members of religious minorities having to confront only the
legislature (while the Court reserves under constitutional authority the right to curb
the worst abuses of the lawmaking body240), rather than the legislature and an
enthusiastic lawmaking court as well.
Religious schools, then, face a two-fold threat to their autonomy posed by
legislatures and courts. The threat from legislatures, exemplified by the Cleveland
provisions, can be fought in the traditional way, by speaking and voting.
The threat posed by courts is that schools receiving state money could be
determined to be state actors, and face forced compliance with the Equal Protection
and Due Process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to mention civil
rights liability should they fail to do so.241 The Civil Rights Cases decided in the 19th
Century determined that the Fourteenth Amendment could only govern state action,
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not private conduct.242 For years, the Court has wrestled with the question of what
constitutes state action.243
It may seem extremely unlikely that the Court will find that a school accepting
voucher money is a state actor. In discussing the Establishment Clause implications
of the Cleveland program, the majority wrote in Zelman, “[t]he incidental
advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious
message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government,
whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.”244 The Court emphasized that
the vouchers were “a program of true private choice.”245 Furthermore, in RendellBaker v. Kohn,246 the Supreme Court held in 1982 that a high school receiving at
least 90% of its funding from the government was not a state actor.247 On the other
hand, the Court decided in Brentwood v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass’n248 in 2001 that an athletic association comprised of both public and private
high schools was a state actor.249 Although it is improbable, then, that receiving a
voucher will somehow translate into state action should the issue come up in a later
case, it is by no means impossible. If courts should reach such a conclusion, no
amount of speaking or voting will make any difference.
VI. CONCLUSION
Any nation in which the state plays as expansive a role in the lives of its citizens
as ours has in the wake of Everson will not fail to pose a threat to religion in one of
two ways: through its own teaching power by means of its own institutions, or
through its reach into otherwise autonomous institutions. In the first instance, a
threat arises when the government requires universal education, and ensures a near
monopoly of its free provision through secular public schools. A threat arises in the
second instance when the state contracts out the project of educating its citizens by
means of, say, vouchers, and attaches strings to the voucher money that restrict the
freedom of the recipient institutions.
If the Supreme Court adopts a moderate substantive interpretation or a
jurisdictional interpretation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause (and it
seems to have done the former in the Zelman case), the first problem will no longer
rear its ugly head. When the Court abandons the radical separationist interpretation,
it no longer mandates anything resembling an establishment of irreligion in the
public schools. Confronting the second problem, however, will require a
reconsideration of jurisprudence in other areas as well.
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In the fight against state usurpation and control, a better friend for religion than
favorable court decisions is popular demand and legislative prudence. At this point,
Congress and state legislatures, informed by a public interested in the autonomy of
the church, can do the most for religious institutions by scaling back the reach of
government.
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